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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

graphic transcript of the trial court record, or a
partial transcript, or any other aid adequate
for the compilation of the appellant's bill of
exceptions, according to the needs of each
particular case.
(A) Where the petitioner was convicted after
April 23, 1956 [the date of the United States
United States Supreme Court decision in the
Griqin case] the petition shall be verified by the
petitioner and shall state facts showing that he
was at the time of his conviction without
financial means to prepare an adequate bill of
exceptions.
(B) Where the petitioner was convicted prior
to April 23, 1956, the petition shall be verified
by the petitioner and shall state:
(1) The date of his conviction and the charge
upon which he was convicted.
(2) Facts showing that he was at the time
of his conviction without financial means to
prepare an adequate bill of exceptions or to
pay the printing costs of an appellate brief.
In a case where the petitioner is indigent at
the time of filing his petition under this act,
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he shall be afforded financial aid. In the case
where the petitioner at the time of filing his
petition is no longer indigent, he shall not be
afforded financial aid; but he nevertheless
may obtain the appellate review which, because of his prior indigency was not available
to him at the time of his conviction.
(a) If the petitioner, following his conviction, had requested and was refused such
aid for reasons other than failure to establish his indigency, his contention of prior
indigency shall be presumed true. This
presumption may be rebutted by evidence
indicating the falsity of the petitioner's
allegation of prior indigency.
(b) If the petitioner, following his conviction, had not requested aid, he shall have
the burden of substantiating his allegations
of prior indigency.
(3) The alleged errors which petitioner claims
occurred at his trial.
(4) That he desires to apply for issuance of a
writ of error to review the conviction.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Trial Court May Grant Defendant Discovery Of His Statement Made To PoliceFollowing his arrest on a charge of murder, the
defendant was taken to a hospital for medical
treatment. At the hospital, the defendant, in
response to questioning by police, made a statement setting forth the circumstances of the
crime. The statement was recorded by a court
reporter. Prior to the trial, defense counsel unsuccessfully sought to inspect or obtain a copy
of the statement from the police and the trial
judge refused to order such inspection. At the
trial, selected portions of the statement were
introduced in evidence by the prosecution for
the purpose of impeaching the defendant's
testimony. Because the jury was unable to
agree on a verdict, a mistrial was declared.
Thereafter, the prosecution obtained a change
of venue and proposed to retry the defendant
before a different judge. Prior to this trial, the
judge, upon defendant's motion, ordered the

prosecutor to permit defense counsel to inspect
and copy, before trial, the statement taken
from the defendant. The prosecution then
petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court to
restrain the trial court from enforcing its order.
The appellate court, with two members dissenting, affirmed the trial court's order, holding
that, unless expressly prohibited by statute, a
court has the inherent power to order discovery
by defense counsel of the defendant's statement
in the hands of the prosecutor. State v. Supreme
Court of Santa Cruz County, 302 P.2d 263
(Ariz. 1956).
On appeal, the prosecution contended that
the order requiring that defense counsel be
permitted to inspect the defendant's statement
was "in excess of the jurisdiction and authority"
of the trial court. Such statements, the state
argued, are part of the "work product" of the
prosecution, access to which by the opponent is
forbidden. In addition, the state said, such

1957]

CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMkIBNTS

discovery would seriously jeopardize the state's
chance of obtaining a conviction. The defendant
maintained that such inspection was expressly
authorized by the state rules of court procedure
and that, in addition, requiring such discovery
was within the inherent power of the trial
court. The state Supreme Court Rule providing
for discovery in criminal cases, the corn t said,
is identical in language to rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. For this reason,
the court examined those cases which have
interpreted the federal rule pertaining to discovery. A majority of federal courts, it was
said, have held that federal rule 16 has no
application to statements made by the defendant. Accordingly, the court held that the
Arizona court rule neither authorizes nor sanctions inspection by the defendant of his statements in the hands of the prosecutor. However,
the court said, the rule "does not express a
policy prohibiting discovery." For this reason
it was further held a court has the "inherent
residual power" to permit broader discovery
that than authorized by the rule. Nevertheless,
the court indicated that a defendant does not
have an unqualified right to discovery of his
statement or confession. An application for
such discovery, the court said, is addressed to
the trial court's discretion and should be
granted only in exceptional cases where such
inspection is "essential to the due administration of justice."
In regard to the state's contention that the
defendant's statement is part of the prosecution's "work product", the court conceded
that an attorney's work product is not subject
to pre-trial inspection. The court encountered
difficulty, however, in defining the term "work
product". That term, the court said, has been
held to include "interviews, memoranda, and
statements" taken down by an attorney. However, the court indicated that a proper definition of an attorney's work product should not
include materials which are to be used as evidence at the trial. Since, in the present case, the
prosecution used the defendant's statement as
evidence at the first trial and indicated an
intention to use it at the second trial, the court
concluded that the statement was not part of

the prosecution's work product and is subject
to pre-trial inspection.
The dissent pointed out that, prior to the
majority's decision, a defendant was precluded
from discovery of his statements on the grounds
that they were "the private papers" of the
person who records then. The trial court, the
dissent said, had no authority to adopt a different view.
Prosecutor's Reference To Lie-Detector
Test Held Not Prejudicial-Following his
indictment on a charge of breaking and entering with intent to steal, the defendant
voluntarily submitted to a lie-detector test.
Before trial, the defendant filed a motion, which
apparently was never ruled upon by the trial
judge, requesting that he be given a new liedetector test using questions approved by the
court. At the trial, the prosecutor, during the
voir dire examination, asked the jury, "if this
man is shown to have taken a lie-detector test,
is there anybody who at the outset feels that
the lie-detector is all wrong, they should never
be used or that its results are entirely unreliable?" The defendant, objecting to this
inquiry, called the court's attention to the
defendant's earlier motion for a new test and
requested, in the presence of the jury, that
questions regarding the lie test be excluded until
the court ruled upon whether the results of a
test would be admitted. The objection was
sustained. Thereafter, the prosecution introduced as a witness the interrogator who had
administered the lie-detector test and proceeded
to question him regarding the test. Upon the
defendant's objection, the court excluded
testimony regarding the results of the test but
permitted the witness to testify about a conversation presumably had with the defendant
during the test. The Ohio Court of Appeals
affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding
that the prosecutor's reference to the liedetector test was, under the circumstances, not
prejudicial. State v. Rhoads, 137 N.E.2d 628
(Ohio 1955).
The court based its decision upon the fact
that the defendant had voluntarily submitted
to a test and, in addition, had requested a
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second test. Furthermore, the court said, the
defendant had commented upon this request
for a new test in the presence of the jury.
Under these circumstances, the court concluded,
"the jury could not have been misled or
prejudiced by the reference to the test."
Wife Of Prosecutor Is An Incompetent
Juror-The defendant was indicted for killing
a pedestrian while driving in an intoxicated
condition. At the trial, the wife of the prosecutor
was a member of the jury panel from which a
jury was to be selected. During her voir dire
examination, the prosecutor's wife testified
that she had no fixed opinion as to defendant's
guilt and could accord him a fair trial. In addition, she said that she would like to sit on the
jury and did not want to be disqualified. The
trial judge overruled the defendant's objection
to the juror. The defendant then exercised a
peremptory challenge and the juror was removed. In so doing, however, the defendant
exhausted his peremptory challenge and thereafter was forced to accept an objectional juror.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that the wife of a prosecuting attorney may not
serve as a juror in a case which is prosecuted
by her husband. Reynolds v. State, 294 S.W.2d
108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956).
There is no statutory provision, the court
said, which disqualifies the wife of the representative of the state from serving as a juror.
However, it was said, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a fair and impartial trial.
The court expressed doubt that a defendant
would be afforded a fair hearing under these
circumstances. "While the wife of a district
attorney may say and feel in her heart that she
can give a fair and impartial trial to a person
charged with crime and prosecuted by her
husband," the court said, "yet human nature
tends strongly to the contrary."
Tape Recording Of Confession May Be
Played By Jury During Deliberations-The
defendant was arrested for murder and taken
for examination to a state mental hospital. At
the hospital the defendant made a confession of

[Vol. 47

the crime to physicians in the presence of police
officers. The statement was recorded on a tape
recorder. At the trial, the recording was received in evidence and played to the jury. At
the conclusion of the trial, one juror was instructed in the operation of the recording device
and the jury was permitted to take the recording
into the jury room and play it during their
deliberations. After the jury had retired, the
defendant objected to the jury's use of the
recording on the grounds that no juror was
qualified to properly operate the device and, in
addition, that to permit the playing of the
recording in the jury room would give undue
prominence to this evidence. The Supreme
Court of Iowa affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that a recorded confession may
be taken into the jury room. State v. Triplett,
79 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa 1956).
While expressing doubt as to the timeliness of
the defendant's objection to the jury's use of
the recording, the court nevertheless considered
the merits of the objection. The court easily disposed of the defendant's contention that no
juror was competent to operate the machine.
The court observed that one juror had been instructed in the machine's use and that there was
no showing that the recorder was improperly
operated. In regard to the question of whether
the recording should have been taken to the
jury room at all, the court relied on the case of
State v. Gensmer, 235 Minn. 72, 51 N.W.2d 680
(1951), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
had compared the use by the jury of recordings
with the accepted practice in taking longhand
statements into the jury room. That court had
said, "No one questions that statements in
longhand which have been properly received in
evidence may be taken by the jury into the jury
room. We can see no reason why the mechanism
and the mechanical version of the statement
may not also be received in evidence."
Prospective Jurors Cannot Be Asked Reaction To Evidence Which Might Be OfferedThe defendant was indicted on a charge of unlawfully selling narcotics. At the trial, the defendant's counsel, during the voir dire examination of the jury, asked two prospective jurors
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whether they had anyprejudice against aperson
charged with a narcotics violation and, in addition, whether they would consider in arriving
at a verdict the possibility that a witness for the
prosecution might be biased against the defendant. Later, defense counsel asked another
prospective juror a long, hypothetical question
to the effect that "if it can be shown that the
state officers for reasons that are unexplained
deliberately failed to use available scientific
instruments in their investigation, if this is
shown as an effort to show a deliberate lack of
evidence would you have any prejudice or bias
against such a defense?" The trial court sustained the prosecution's objections to these
questions. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana affirmed the defendant's conviction.
State v. Williams, 89 So.2d 898 (La. 1956).
The court construed the questions asked by
defense counsel as an attempt to elicit the jury's
reaction to evidence which might be introduced
at the trial. A state statute, the court said, provides that the voir dire examination of prospective jurors is to be limited to an examination of
their qualifications to try the case. Such an examination, the court observed, may not be
used "to elicit in advance the jurors' opinions
as to whether they were prejudiced concerning
some future defense." For these reasons, the
court concluded, the trial judge wisely exercised
his discretion by sustaining objections to the
questions.
Where Conviction Of Lesser Offense Than
That Charged In Indictment Is Reversed, Retrial For Crime Charged In Indictment Does
Not Constitute Double Jeopardy-The defendant, indicted on a charge of first degree murder,
had been convicted of the lesser included offense
of second degree murder. On appeal this conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered on the
grounds that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury (and to the defendant's prejudice) that
they might return a verdict of second degree
rather than first degree murder, since "all the
testimony pointed to murder in the first degree
and nothing else." Green v. United States, 218
F.2d- 856 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Thereafter the
defendant was retried on the charge of fisrt
degree murder contained in the original indict-

ment. The evidence presented at the second
trial was substantially the same as that considered at the previous trial. The judge, however,
did not instruct the jury as to second degree
murder. At this trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, with two members dissenting, affirmed
the conviction, holding that, where a defendant
has been convicted of a lesser offense than that
charged in the indictment, and that conviction
is reversed on appeal, a new trial for the crime
charged in the indictment, rather than for the
lesser offense, does not constitute double
jeopardy. Gr e v. United States, 236 F.2d 708

(D.C. Cir. 1956).
The defendant contended on appeal that his
conviction, at the first trial, of second degree
murder amounted to an acquittal of ihe charge
of first degree murder and that he could not be
retried for an offense of which he had been
acquitted. The majority based its rejection of
this argument on Trono v. United States, 199
U.S. 521 (1905), in which the United States
Supreme Court had said, "the better doctrine
is that which does not limit the court or jury,
upon a new trial, to the consideration of the
question of guilt of the lower offense of which the
accused was convicted on the first trial, but that
the reversal of the judgment of conviction opens
up the whole controversy and acts upon the
original judgment as if it had never been. The
accused by his own action has obtained a
reversal of the whole judgment, and we see no
reason why he should not, upon a new trial, be
proceeded against as if no trial had previously
taken place."
The dissent reasoned that the defendant's conviction of second degree murder constituted an
acquittal of first degree murder. The defendant,
the dissent said, had appealed only from the
second degree murder conviction. That appeal,
it was said, did not bring before the court the
defendant's acquittal of the first degree murder
charge. For this reason, the dissent said, the
defendant did not waive his right not to be
placed in jeopardy a second time for first degree
murder. The dissent maintained that the Trono
case was not applicable to the present situation
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since that case arose under Philippine law. The
law of that jurisdiction, the dissent continued,
permitted the entire case to be reviewed and
tried de novo before the appellate court. Thus,
it was said, under Philippine procedure anappellant convicted of a lesser offense, by seeking
review, waived his acquittal of a more serious
offense. Since such is not the practice in the
United States, the dissent urged the adoption
of the prevailing view at common law which
would preclude a re-trial of the greater offense
of which the defendant had been acquitted.
Entrapment By State Officers Is Good Defense To Federal Prosecution; Denial Of Crime
Charged Does Not Preclude Defense Of
Entrapment-A state police officer, while on
inactive duty and engaged in nonpolice work
was requested by a local deputy sheriff to assist
him in the detection of violations of state
liquor laws. As a result, the state officer contacted the defendant and, after several meetings, persuaded the defendant to open a moonshine distillery with the police officer. While
operating the still with the defendant, the
officer was appointed a special investigator for
the state attorney general. Thereafter, the
United States Treasury Department assigned
an agent to assist the state officer. Subsequently,
the defendant and several companions were
arrested by the federal agent and charged with
distilling moonshine in violation of the Internal
Revenue Code. At the trial in a federal district
Court, the defendant, pleading not guilty, admitted operating the still but denied participating in the alleged conspiracy. In addition,
the defendant pleaded entrapment by the state
police officer. The prosecutor admitted that the
defendant opened the still as the result of the
state officer's persuasion. The trial court, however, refused to instruct the jury on the issue of
entrapment on the grounds that the defendant,
by denying participation of the conspiracy, was
precluded from relying on the defense of entrapment. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that denial of the act charged
does not preclude reliance on the defense of
entrapment and that entrapment by a state
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officer is a valid defense to a federal prosecution.
Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th
Cir. 1956).
The initial question considered by the court
was whether entrapment may be relied upon
when commission of the crime is specifically
denied. Rule 8(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permits a party to plead all
possible defenses "regardless of consistency."
While there is no such provision applicable to
criminal proceedings, the court observed that
rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that all possible defenses
are included within a plea of not guilty. It is
well settled, the court said, that a not guilty
plea raises the defense of entrapment. However,
it was said, the defendant may not necessarily
rely on entrapment as well as deny the act
charged. As the test of when reliance on both
defenses is permissible, the court adopted the
rule followed at common law in regard to civil
actions. The test, the court said, is whether
proof of one defense is so inconsistent with proof
of the other defense that proof of the one must
disprove the other. In the present case, the
court concluded, the defendant could consistently claim that "I did not go so far as to become a party to the conspiracy, but to the
extent that I did travel down to the road to
crime, I was entrapped." Thus, the court said,
both defenses, entrapment and denial of the
crime, could properly be presented.
The court was unable to find prior decisions
on the question of whether inducement by state,
rather than federal, officers constituted entrapment. It is well settled, the court said, that inducement by a private citizen, rather than a law
enforcement officer, does not constitute entrapment. In addition, the court observed, cases involving double jeopardy and the use of evidence
obtained through illegal search and seizure
appear to establish that the state and federal
governments are separate sovereignties. The
court, however, rejected these analogies. State
officers, it was said, do not stand in the same
relation to the federal government as do private
citizens or officers of a foreign sovereignty. It
has been held, the court observed, that state offi-
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cers may be required to enforce federal law. In
the present case, the court said, while the state
officers were not required by statute to enforce
the federal law, it was permissible and proper
for them to assist the federal agents. For this
reason, the court concluded that "when a state
officer has induced a person otherwise innocent
to commit a crime in order to punish him there-

fore, the United States cannot take over the
task of punishment by prosecuting for the
federal offense without allowing the defense of
entrapment, the same as if the inducement had
been by a federal officer."
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police
Science Legal Abstracts and Notes", infra pp.
741-745.)

